Introduction
Neuropsychology has relied on a variety of methods to obtain information about human 'cognitive architecture' from the profiles of capacities and incapacities presented by normal and abnormal subjects. The nineteenthcentury neuropsychological tradition associated with Broca, Wernicke, Meynert, and Lichtheim attempted to correlate abnormal behaviour with loci of brain damage, and thus to found syndrome classification ultimately on neuroanatomy. At the same time, they aimed to use the data of abnormal cognitive incapacities to found inferences to the functional architecture of the normal human cognitive system. Contemporary work in neuropsychology involves statistical studies of the correlation of behaviour with physical measures of brain activity in both normal and abnormal subjects, statistical studies of the correlations of behavioural abnormalities in groups of subjects, and studies of behavioural abnormalities in particular individuals, sometimes in conjunction with information about the locations of lesions.2 The goal of identifying the functional structure of normal cognitive architecture remains as it was in the l9th century. The fundamental methodological issues about the enterprise of cognitive neuropsychology concern the characterization of methods by which features of normal cognitive architecture can be identified from any of the kinds of data just mentioned, the assumptions upon which the reliability of such methods are premised, and the limits of such methods even granting their assumptions in resolving uncertainties about that architecture. These questions have recently been the subject of intense debate occasioned by a series of articles by Caramazza and his collaborators: these articles have prompted a number of responses, including at least one book. As the issues have been framed in these exchanges, they concern:
1. whether studies of the statistical distribution of abnormalities in groups of subjects selected by syndrome, by the character of brain lesions, or by other means, are relevant evidence for determining cognitive architecture; 2. whether the proper form of argument in cognitive neuropsychology is 'hypothetico-deductive' in which a theory is tested by deducing from it consequences whose truth or falsity can be determined more or less directly or 'bootstrap testing' in which theories are tested by assuming parts of them and using those parts to deduce (noncircularly) from the data instances of other parts of the theory; 3. whether associations of capacities, or cases of dissociation in which one of two normally concurrent capacities is absent, or double dissociations in which of two normally concurrent capacities, A and B, one abnormal subject possesses capacity A but not B, while another abnormal subject possesses B but not A7 are the 'more important' form of evidence about normal cognitive architecture.
Bub and Bub [1988] object that Caramazza7s arguments against group studies assume a 'hypothetico-deductive picture of theory testing in which a hypothesis is confirmed by a body of data if from the hypothesis (and perhaps auxiliary assumptions) a description of the data can be deduced. They suggest that inference to cognitive architecture from neuropsychological data follows instead a 'bootstrap' pattern much like that described by Glymour [1980] .3 They, and also Shallice [1988] reassert that double dissociation data provide especially important evidence for cognitive architecture. Shallice argues that if a functional module underlying two capacities is a connectionist computational system of which one capacity requires more computational resources than another, then injuries to the module that remove one of these capacities may leave the other intact. The occurrence of subjects having one of these capacities and lacking the other (dissociation) therefore will not permit a decision as to whether or not there is a functional module required for the first capacity but not required for the second. Double dissociations Shallice claimsn do permit this . .
c .eclslon.
The main issue in these disputes is this: by what methods, and from what sorts of data, can the truth about various questions of cognitive architecture be foundX whatever the truth may be? There is a tradition in computer science and in mathematical psychology that provides a means for resolViIlg such questions. Work in this tradition characterizes mathematically whether or not specific questions can be settled in principle from specific kinds of evidence. Positive results are proved by exhibiting some method and demonstrating that it can reliably reach the truth; negative results are proved by showing that no possible method can do so. There are results of these kinds about the impossibility of predicting the behavior of a 'black boxX with an unknown Turing machine inside; about the possibility of such predictions when the black box is known to contain a finite automaton rather than a Turing machine (Gold [1965] ); about the indistinguishability of parallel and serial procedures for short-term memory phenomena (Luce [1986] ); about which classes of mathematically possible languages could and could not be learned by humans (Osherson and Weinstein [1985] ); about whether a computationally bounded system can be distinguished from an uncomputable system by any behavioral evidence (Glymour and Kelly, to appear); about the logical limits of the propositions that caIl be resolved by any learner (Kelly, submitted) and much more. However abstract and remote from practice such results may seem, they address the logical essence of questions about discovery and relevant evidence. From this point of view disputes in cognitive neuropsychology about one or another specific form of argument are well motivated but ill directed: they are focused on the wrong questions.
From what sorts of evidence, and with what sorts of background assumptions, can questions of interest in cognitive psychology be resolved no matter what the answer to them may be by some possible method; and from what sorts of evidence and background assumptions can they not be resolved by any possible method? With some idealization) the question of the capacities of various experimental designs in cognitive neuropsychology to uncover cognitive architecture can be reduced to comparatively simple questions about the prior assumptions investigators are willing to make. The point of this paper is to present some of the simplest of those reductions.
Theories as functional diagrams and graphs
Neuropsychological theories typically assume that the brain instantiates 'functional modules' that have specific roles in producing cognitive behaviour. In the processes that produce cognitive behaviourS some of the output of some modules is sent as input to other modules until eventually the task behaviour is produced. Various hypothetical functional modules have standard names, e.g. the 'phonemic buSer' and accounts of what the modules are supposed to do. Such theories or Cmodels' are often presented by diagrams. For exampleS as depicted in Figure 1 , Ellis and Young [1988] consider a 'functional model' for object recognition. What do the arrows in the diagrams mean, and what does it mean if one or more of them is missing because of injury? In explaining profiles of normal capacities and abnormal incapacities with the aid of such a diagram, the modules and their connections are understood to be embedded in a larger structure that serves as a kind of deus ex machirza in producing particular inputs or particular outputs. For example, a subjects capacity to name familiar objects in experimental trials is explained by assuming that the objects are supplied as input to this diagram, and that the subject has somehow correctly processed the instruction 'name the object before you', and this processing has adjusted the parameters of the functional modules and their connections so that the subject will indeed attempt to name the object. None of the instructional processing is represented in Figure 1 . Further, it is understood that the modules represented in such diagrams are connected to other possible outputs that are not represented, and with different instructional processing the very same stimulus would activate a different collection of paths that would result in a different output. For example if the subject were instructed 'copy the object before you' and processed this information normallyS then the presentation of the object would not bring about an attempt to speak the name of the object but instead to draw it. In effect, most parts of theories of cognitive architecture are tacit, and the normal behaviour to be expected from a set of instructions and a stimulus can only be inferred from the descriptions given of the internal modules. For exampleS when Ellis and Young describe an internal module as the 'speech output lexicon' we assume that it must be activated in any process producing coherent speech, but not in processes producing coherent writing or in the processes of understanding speech writing or gestures. Evidently leaving much of the theory tacit and indicated only by descriptions of internal modules is a great convenience and a practical necessity although it may sometimes occasion misunderstanding, equivocation and unprofitable disputes.
The practice of cognitive neuroscience makes a great deal of use of scientists' capacities to exploit descriptions of hypothetical internal modules in order to contrive experiments that test a particular theory. Equally, the skills of practitioners are required to distinguish various kinds or features of stimuli as belonging properly to different inputs, meaning that these features are processed diSerently under one and the same set of instructions. To address the questions at issue I propose to leave these features of the enterprise to one side, and assume for the moment that everyone agrees as to what stimulus conditions should be treated as inputs to a common input channel in the normal cognitive architecture, and that everyone agrees as to what behaviours should be treated as outputs from a common output channel.
It is also clear that in practice there are often serious ambiguities about the range of performance that constitutes normal, or respectively abnormal7 behaviour and that much of the important work in cognitive neuropsychology consists in resolving such ambiguities. I will also put these matters to one side and assume that all such issues are settled, and there is agreement as to which behaviours count as abnormal in a setting, and which normal.
With these rather radical idealizations, what can investigation of the patterns of capacities and incapacities in normal and abnormal subjects tell us about the normal architecture?
Formalities
Figure 2 represents another diagram by Ellis and Young. The idea is that a signal, auditory or visual, enters the system, and various things are done to it; the double arrows indicate that the signal is passed back and forth, the single arrows indicate that it is passed in only one direction. The intended reading of the diagram is that if it is intact then spoken and written words will be understood and can produce speech in response that indicates understanding. IfS however, any path through the semantic system from the input channel is disrupted while the rest of the system remains intact, then the remaining paths to the phoneme level will enable the subject to repeat a spoken word or pronounce a written wordS but not to understand it.
The evidence offered for a diagram consists of profiles of capacities that are found among people with brain injuries. There are people who can repeat spoken words but cannot recognize them; people who can recognize spoken words but cant understand them; people who show parallel incapacities for written words; people who can repeat, or recognize or understand spoken words but not written, and people with the reverse capacities. What is the logic of inferences from profiles of this kind to graphs or diagrams? To investigate that question I want to consider diagrams that are slightly diSerent from those illustrated.
First, I want the performances whose appearance or failure (under appropriate inputs) is used in evidence to be explicitly represented as vertices in the graphs, and I want the corresponding stimuli or inputs to be likewise distinguished. So where Ellis and Young have an output channel labelled simply 'speech' I want output nodes labelled 'repeats', 'repeats with recognition', 'repeats with understanding'. Anywhere that a psychologist would identify a normal capacity I want a corresponding set of input nodes and output nodes. This convention in no way falsifies the problem for such relations are certainly implicit in the theory that goes with the conventional diagram; I am only making things a bit more explicit. Second, I want to consider only the identification of pathways that are essential for a normal capacity. So if we were considering only the structure associated with the capacity to repeat a spoken word with understanding, the existence of pathways from the heard word to speech that do not pass through the 'semantic system' would be irrelevant. There are certainly examples in the literature of capacities that have alternative pathways either of which will produce the appropriate outputs. I will ignore this complication. The justification for this second assumption is that I want to explore limitations on any possible strategy for identifying cognitive structure from normal and abnormal profiles of capacities. Restricting ourselves to identifying essential pathways and ignoring the possibility of alternative pathways that are sufficient for a capacity makes the problem of distinguishing one graph from others easier rather than harder. Limitations that hold for easier problems will hold as well for more diflicult problems
The system of hypothetical modules and their connections form a directed graphS that is a set V of vertices or nodes and a set E of ordered pairs of vertices, each ordered pair representing a directed edge from the first member of the pair to the second. Some of the vertices represent input that can be given to a subject in an experimental task and some of the vertices represent measures of behavioural response. (We count instructions to subjects as part of the input.) Everything in betweenS which is to say most of the directed graph that represents the cognitive architecture, is unobserved. Each vertex between input and behavioural response can represent a very complicated structure which may be localized in the brain or may somehow be distributed; each directed edge represents a pathway by which information is communicated.
Such a directed graph may be a theory of the cognitive architecture of normals; the architecture of abnormals is obtained by supposing that one or more of the vertices or directed edges of the normal graph has been removed. Any individual subject is assumed to instantiate some such graph. In the simplest case, we can think of the output nodes of such a directed graph as taking values 0 and 1, where the value 1 obtains when the subject exhibits the behaviour expected of normal subjects for appropriate inputs and instructions, and the value of 0 obtains for abnormal behavior in those circumstances.
One of the ideas of cognitive neuropsychology is that one and the same module can be involved in the processing of quite different inputs related to quite different outputs. For example, a general 'semantic system' may be involved in using knowledge in speech processing, but it may also be involved in using knowledge in writing or in non-verbal tasks. Some of the input channels that are relevant to a non-verbal task that accesses the 'semantic system' may not be input channels for a verbal task that accesses the 'semantic system'. Although there is in the diagram or graph a directed graph from input channels particular to non-verbal tasks to the output channels of verbal tasks, those inputs are none the less irrelevant to the verbal task. Formally, the idea is that in addition to the directed graph structure there is what I shall call a relevance structure that determines for a given output variable that it depends on some of the input variables to which it is connected in the directed graph but not on other input variables to which it is so connected. The relevance structure is simply part of the theory the cognitive scientist provides. One and the same output variable can have several distinct relevant input sets. I will call a capacity any pair (I, U), where U is an output variable (or vertex) and I is a set of input vertices, such that in normals the set I of inputs is relevant to output U.
Between input and output a vast number of alternative graphs of hypothetical cognitive architecture are possible a priori. The fundamental inductive task of cognitive psychology, including cognitive neuropsychology, is to describe correctly the intervening structure that is common to normal humans.
To begin with I make some simplifying assumptions about the direct graph that represents normal human cognitive architecture. I will later consider how some of them can be altered.
A1. Assume the graph is acyclic. That isS the internal process that
results in a subject's exhibiting a normal cognitive competence on any particular occasion in response to any particular set of inputs is such that for each functional module X activated in the process, there is no sequence of modules X1, X2, . . . Xn, such that some output of X goes to X1, some output of X1 goes to X2, . . ., and some output of Xn goes to X. A2. Assume that the behavioural response variables take only 0 or 1 as values, where the value 1 means, roughly, that the subject exhibits the normal competence, and the value 0 means that the subject does not exhibit normal competence. A3. Assume that all normal subjects have the same graph i.e. the same cognitive architecture. A4. Assume that the graph of the cognitive architecture of any abnormal subject is a subgraph of the normal graph i.e. is a graph obtained by deleting either edges or vertices (and of course all edges containing any deleted vertex) or both in the normal graph. AS. The default value of all output nodes the value they exhibit when they have not been activated by a cognitive process is zero. A6. If any path from a relevant input variable to an output variable that occurs in the normal graph is missing in an abnormal graph, the abnormal subject will output the value O for that output variable on inputs for which the normal subject outputs 1 for that variable. A7. Every subgraph of the normal graph will eventually occur among abnormal subjects.
These assumptions are in some respects unrealistic; input and output are not clear 0, 1 valued functions, for example, and undoubtedly there is feedback among modules. These complications do not affect negative results below, but they make suspect the application to practice of positive formal results. Further, one might object to the assumption that all pathways in a graph between input and output must be intact for the normal capacity. An alternative explored by Bub and Bub [1988] is that just one pathway need be intact. It turns out, however, that this interpretation only makes identification of structure more difficult, but does not change the essential results. I have assumed, in keeping with what seems to be theoretical practice, that the architectural diagrams do not include directed edges representing connections that inhibit an eSect. If such edges were allowed, injuries could present new capacities not present in normals; from a formal point of view the possibility is interesting and should be investigated.
Discovery problems and success
We want to know whenS subject to these assumptionsS features of normal cognitive architecture can be identified from the profiles of the behavioural capacities and incapacities of normals and abnormals It is useful to be a little more precise about what we wish to know, so as to avoid some likely . contuslons.
I will say that a discovery problem consists of a collection of alternative conceivable graphs of normal cognitive architecture. So far as we know a priori, any graph in the collection may be the true normal cognitive architecture. We want our methods to be able to identify the true structure7 no matter which graph in the collection it is, or we want our methods to be able to answer some question about the true structure, no matter which graph in the collection it is. Whichever graph may actually describe normal architecture, the scientist receives examples-subjectswho instantiate the normal graph and who instantiate various subgraphs of the normal graph. For each subject the scientist obtains a profile of that subject's capacities and incapacities. So, abstractly, we can think of the scientist as obtaining a sequence of capacity profiles, where the maximal profiles (those with the most capacities) are all from the true but unknown normal graph, and other profiles are from subgraphs of that normal graph.
Because of A7 eventually the scientist will see every profile of capacities associated with any subgraph of the normal graph. Let us suppose, as is roughly realistic, that the profiles are obtained in a sequenceS with some (perhaps all) profiles being repeated. After each stage in the sequence let the scientist (or a method) conjecture the answer to a question about the architecture. No matter how many distinct profiles have been observed at any stage of inquiryS the scientist cannot be sure that further distinct profiles are not possible. We cannot (save in special cases) be sure at any particular time that circumstance has provided us with every possible combination of injuries, separating all of the capacities that could possibly be separated. Hence, if by success in discovering the normal cognitive architecture we mean that after some finite stage of inquiry the scientist will be able to specify that architecture and know that the specification will not be refuted by any further evidence, success is generally impossible. We should instead require something weaker for success: the scientist should eventually reach the right answer by a method that disposes her to stick with the right answer ever after, even though she may not know when that point has been reached.
I will say that a method of conjecturing the cognitive architecture (or conjecturing an answer to a question about that architecture) succeeds on a discovery problem provided that for each possible architecture, and for each possible ordering (into an unbounded sequence) of the profiles of normals and abnormals associated with that architecture, there is a point after which the method always conjectures the true architecture or always answers the question correctly. If no method can succeed on a discovery problem I will say the problem is unsolvable.
Some examples
Consider the graphs in Figure 3 . The discovery problem posed by this collection of alternative graphs can be solved: whichever graph should describe the true cognitive architecture, one can eventually conjecture the correct graph from a sequence of profiles of normal and abnormal capacities and stick with that conjecture. All of these graphs allow the same normal profile: N = {(I1, U1)) (I1, U2)) (I2, U1), (I2, U2)}. With each of these graphs there is associated the subgraphs that can be formed by deleting one or more edges or vertices. Each normal graph entails constraints on the profiles that can occur in abnormals. Graph (1) network trained to identify a collection of concepts may suffer differential degradation when some of its 'neurons' are removed. With such damage, the network may continue to be able to make some inferences correctly but be unable to perform others. Thus a 'semi-PDP' picture of mental functioning argues that damage to a vertex in a graph of cognitive architecture is damage to some of the neurons of a network and may result in the elimination of some capacities that involve that vertex, but not others. Shallice, for example, has endorsed such a picture, and uses it to argue for the special importance of double dissociation phenomena in cognitive neuropsychology. He suggests that some capacities may be more difficult or computationally demanding than others, and hence more easily disrupted. Double dissociations, he argues, show that of two capacities, at least one of them uses some module not involved in the other capacity. On reflection, it seems clear that Shallice's point could be made about connections between the PDP modules; some capacities may place greater demands on an information channel than do other capacities that use that Consider next whether under the same hypothesis information about profiles of capacities and incapacities permits us to discover anything at all about cognitive architecture. Shallice's assumptions amount to replacing A6 with a more complicated condition, and altering slightly the character of discovery problems.
With each vertex or edge of the normal graph we should imagine a partial ordering of the capacities that involve that edge or vertex. That capacity 1 is less than or equal to capacity 2 in the partial ordering indicates that any damage to that edge or vertex that removes capacity 1 also removes capacity 2. If capacity 1 is less than or equal to capacity 2 and capacity 2 is less than or equal to capacity 1, then any injury to the module that removes one capacity will remove the other. If capacity 1 is less than or equal to capacity 2 for some edge or vertex, but capacity 2 is not less than or equal to capacity 1 for that edge or vertex, then capacity 1 is less than capacity 2 for that edge or vertex, meaning that capacity 2 can be removed by damage to that element without removing capacity 1. If capacity 1 is not less than or equal to capacity 2 for some edge or vertex, and capacity 2 is also not less than or equal to capacity 1 for that edge or vertex, then they are unordered for that graph element, meaning that some injury to that graph element can remove capacity 1 without removing capacity 2, and some injury to that graph element can remove capacity 2 without removing capacity 1. A degenerate case of a partial ordering leaves all capacities unordered. I will call a graph in which there is attached to each vertex and directed edge a partial ordering (including possibly the degenerate ordering) of the capacities involving that graph element a partially ordered graph. The set of objects in a discovery problem are now not simply directed graphs representing alternative possible normal cognitive architectures. The objects are instead partially ordered graphs, where one and the same graph may appear in the problem with many diSerent orderings of capacities attached to its edges and vertices. The presence of such alternatives indicates an absence of background knowledge as to which capacities are more computationally demanding than others. I will assume that the goal of inference remains, however, to identify the true graph structure.
Rather than forming abnormal structures by simply deleting edges or vertices, an injury is implicitly represented by labelling a directed edge or vertex with the set of capacities involving that edge or vertex that are assumed to be damaged. The profile of capacities associated with such a damaged, labelled graph excludes the labelled capacities. Depending on whether or not there is a partial ordering of capacities or outputs attached to graph elements, there are restrictions on the possible labellings. When partial orderings are assumed a discovery problem is posed by a collection of labelled graphs.
On these assumptions alone the enterprise of identifying modular structure from patterns of deficits is hopeless, as a little reflection should make evident. Even the simplest graph structures become indistinguish-able. An easy illustration is given by six graphs in the discovery problem of the previous section. Consider what happens when the discovery problem is expanded by adding to graph 2 some possible orderings of the computational demands placed on the internal module v by the four capacities considered in Figure 9 .
Thus in addition to the profiles allowed by graph (2) previously, any one of the four profiles characteristic of graphs 3-6 may appear, depending on which capacity places the greatest computational demands on the internal module. If all capacities are equally fragile, the set of profiles originally associated with graph 2 is obtained; still other profiles can be obtained if orderings of the internal module of graph 2 are combined with orderings of the directed edges in that graph. Similar things are true of graphs 3-6. Thus unless one has strong prior knowledge as to which capacities are the most computationally demanding (for every module), even simple discovery problems appear hopeless.
Conclusion
The conclusion I draw is not that cognitive neuropsychology is in vain; quite the contrary. My conclusion is that even the smallest formal analysis makes clear some weak points in the project, and emphasizes where argument and inquiry ought to be focused. I regard computational neuropsychological models as interesting and even plausible in many respects, but it should be apparent that any attempts to identify modular functional structure on the assumptions such theories incorporate will depend almost entirely on making good cases about the comparative processing demands of different capacities.
